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ABSTRACT 
On the night of February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman, a member of a 
neighborhood watch program, was patrolling his community in Sanford, Florida, 
when he spotted Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old African-American high 
school student, walking through the neighborhood. Zimmerman dialed 911 and 
indicated that he was following “a real suspicious guy.” The police dispatcher 
requested that Zimmerman discontinue following Martin, but he ignored the request 
and approached the teenager. In the resulting confrontation, Zimmerman used his 
legally owned semi-automatic handgun to shoot and kill Trayvon Martin. Martin, 
who was unarmed, had been returning from a local convenience store.  
George Zimmerman was charged with second-degree murder. At the time of this 
writing, it is unclear whether Zimmerman will be proven guilty of the offense. What 
is certain is that despite the fact that Zimmerman was engaged in law enforcement 
activities, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that restrict police efforts in detaining, 
searching, and interrogating suspects do not apply to neighborhood watch 
organizations. In many states neighborhood watch members may carry firearms and 
are protected from having to retreat when confronted by a suspect under “stand your 
ground” laws. Consequently, neighborhood watch members wield significant 
authority, but they lack the training and limitations to which police are subject. 
This article proposes statutory provisions that would limit the ability of 
neighborhood watch members to confront suspects, mandate training for those 
engaged in law enforcement activities, and expand the exclusionary rule to evidence 
seized illegally by private citizens engaged in law enforcement functions. In this 
way, legislatures would better ensure that due process guarantees are not abandoned 
when law enforcement activities are privatized.  
AUTHOR 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he privatization of criminal law has been a heavily debated topic 
among legal scholars and practitioners.1 As the number and scope 
of criminal laws increase, so do community needs to investigate, try, 
and punish individuals who violate those laws.2 Yet, federal and state 
systems of justice have not been able to fully meet these increased 
demands.3 Consequently, reliance on private groups and organizations 
to help fulfill these needs has become more prevalent.4 The use of 
private entities to assist in performing criminal justice functions has, in 
many ways, allowed for more crime detection, prevention, and 
punishment.5 However, this reliance on private actors to accomplish 
criminal justice tasks is rife with both constitutional and practical 
concerns. 
One area in which the public has long been involved in criminal 
justice efforts is in the policing of neighborhoods to deter and identify 
potential criminal actors.6 Neighborhood watch programs increasingly 
have become a part of community efforts to stem or reduce criminal 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., BRIAN FORST & PETER K. MANNING, THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
POLICING: TWO VIEWS 3–4 (1999); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1171–83 (1999). 
2 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 
223–24 (2007) (“The politics of crime are perennially perverse: the electorate 
demands that legislatures enact more crimes and tougher sentences, and no 
interest groups or countervailing political forces lobby against those 
preferences.”). 
3 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of 
Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266–75 (2010). 
4 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1174 (“At this point, security guards in the United 
States actually outnumber law enforcement personnel; there are roughly three 
private guards for every two sworn officers.”). 
5 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1177–78 (“Increasingly, though, government agencies 
are hiring private security personnel to guard and patrol government buildings, 
housing projects, and public parks and facilities . . . .”). In addition, some 
municipalities have gone so far as to hire private security to conduct public 
police functions such as neighborhood patrols. Id. at 1177. Where the 
municipality itself does not hire private police, neighborhoods have “received 
permission to tax themselves (and their dissenting neighbors) to pay for private 
patrols.” Id. at 1178. 
6 This function has been accomplished through both neighborhood watch 
programs and the hiring of private security patrols by members of the 
community. Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1173. 
T 
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activity.7 These programs can vary widely in organization, association 
with law enforcement, training, and purpose.8 But at their core, 
neighborhood watch programs consist of private citizens who are 
engaged in the detection and deterrence of crime—in other words, law 
enforcement activities. 
In 2012, neighborhood watch programs came under heightened 
scrutiny with the shooting death of an unarmed African-American 
teenager in Florida by a member of a neighborhood watch 
association.9 The actions taken by a private individual acting on behalf 
of a private group to serve the public function of crime prevention 
highlighted some of the problems presented by these programs and the 
challenges raised by the increased privatization of criminal justice. 
A significant problem associated with neighborhood watch 
programs is that there are no meaningful laws that specifically govern 
the police-like actions of the members of these programs. Further, 
constitutional amendments that restrict the actions of police officers 
engaging in law enforcement activities do not govern the actions of 
private citizens. Just as constitutional amendments and statutes relating 
to criminal investigations do not govern the actions of private security 
guards engaged in law enforcement functions, so too are there no 
constitutional restrictions or statutes governing the actions of private 
                                                            
7 See Katy Holloway et al., Does Neighborhood Watch Reduce Crime?, 3 CRIME 
PREVENTION RES. REV. 6 (DEP’T OF JUST., 2008). 
8 Id. For various examples of resources available to those interested in starting 
neighborhood watch programs, see Neighborhood Watch Can Lower Your 
Crime Rate, USEFUL CMTY. DEV., http://www.useful-community-development
.org/neighborhood-watch.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012); Edward J. Drew & 
Jeffrey M. McGuigan, Prevention of Crime: An Overview of Gated Communities 
and Neighborhood Watch, INT’L FOUND. FOR PROT. OFFICERS, http://www.ifpo
.org/articlebank/gatedcommunity.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012); What is 
Crime Watch, TARPON SPRINGS POLICE DEP’T, http://www.tspd.us/crime_watch
.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012); Dallas Crime Watch Resource Package, 
DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.dallaspolice.net/content/11
/66/uploads/DallasCrimeWatchResourcePackage.pdf; USAONWATCH.ORG, http
://www.usaonwatch.org/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). 
9 See, e.g., Brian Stelter, In Florida Shooting Case, A Circuitous Route to 
National Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at B1; Greg Botelho, What 
Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN.COM (May 23, 2012), http:
//www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/index.html; 
Susan Jacobson, Trayvon Martin Case: Panel Reviews Media Coverage, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 11, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-
08-11/news/os-trayvon-martin-black-journalists-20120811. 
92 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 88 
citizens engaged in the prevention and detection of crime as members 
of a neighborhood watch program.10 
As a result, members of neighborhood watch programs regularly 
engage in law enforcement functions without any of the legal 
restrictions that limit the actions of police conducting the same tasks. 
Thus, to better preserve individual liberties, statutes should be enacted 
by state legislatures that would restrict the ability of neighborhood 
watch members to confront suspects, mandate that members receive 
training on law enforcement techniques, and require the exclusion of 
evidence illegally seized by neighborhood watch members. By 
enacting such laws, legislatures would better ensure that private 
individuals performing public law enforcement tasks do not erode due 
process guarantees. 
This article examines the difficulties presented by the privatization 
of criminal justice through the lens of neighborhood watch programs. 
The article first identifies some of the ways in which criminal justice 
functions have become privatized. The article then looks at 
neighborhood watch programs, specifically focusing on their history 
and effectiveness as a means of detecting and deterring crime. The 
article next addresses some of the legal mechanisms that empower 
these programs but which fail to restrict them, thereby undermining 
many of the procedural protections that form the basis of the American 
criminal justice system. Finally, this article suggests ways in which 
these challenges can be resolved in the context of neighborhood watch 
associations. 
II. THE TREND TOWARD PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL LAW 
The increased privatization of criminal justice functions is a 
phenomenon that has been both criticized and lauded by practitioners 
and academics alike. “Privatization” can be accomplished in a host of 
ways; in its most basic form, it is the adoption of public functions by 
private entities or individuals.11 In the civil justice system, 
                                                            
10 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1229. 
11 See Talia Fisher, A Nuanced Approach to the Privatization Debate, 5 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 71, 74 (2011) (describing the market-based approach to 
privatization). “Under the market-based approach to legal privatization, the 
market is conceived of as the alternative to state supply of legislation and 
adjudication.” Id. (citing MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY, AND 
LIBERTY 61 (1982)). According to this approach, “law is put on the market by 
for-profit firms and arises from the processes of the market economy—supply 
and demand, competition and bargaining.” Id. 
2013 Watching the Watchers 93 
privatization has led to the use of mediation and other alternative 
dispute resolution techniques.12 In the criminal justice system, the 
trend toward privatization has heavily impacted law enforcement and 
punishment systems.13 This shift toward using private groups or 
entities to handle public criminal justice tasks, although the result of 
numerous factors, reflects a return to historical norms rather than the 
emergence of a new phenomenon.14 
Prior to the nineteenth century, criminal justice functions were left 
largely in the hands of private individuals or groups.15 Reliance on 
government officials to conduct investigations into criminal activity 
was the exception, rather than the rule.16 Indeed, there was few, if any, 
public entities tasked with ferreting out and prosecuting criminal 
conduct.17 For much of modern history, private individuals and groups 
were responsible for investigating crimes and seeking punishment for 
the wrongdoer.18 In England, it was not until the twelfth century that 
certain types of torts were declared to be crimes.19 Prior to that, the 
victim of what would today be considered a “crime” would file a civil 
suit.20 This change resulted in the prosecution of defendants for their 
                                                            
12 See Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 
771, 773–74 (2008) (discussing the growing privatization of “court-based 
processes across the docket”). 
13 Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 911 
(2007). 
14 Id. at 921. The historical trend away from privatization can be seen in many 
branches of government, not just law enforcement. FORST & MANNING, supra 
note 1, at 4 (“Policing, like most functions of modern government, was once 
exclusively in the domain of private enterprise.”). Further, this trend is not 
confined to the United States, but “has been mirrored in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the world.” 
Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1181. 
15 Simmons, supra note 13, at 921–23. 
16 See id. at 922 (“Before the nineteenth century, public criminal justice was 
essentially a form of ‘mandatory community service’: although most towns 
relied upon night watchmen to guard or patrol the community, these watchmen 
were unpaid and were simply ordinary citizens who served in the positions on a 
rotating basis; if any trouble occurred, they were meant to raise an alarm, at 
which point all citizens were required to assist in the arrest.” (citations omitted)). 
17 Id. at 921–22. 
18 Id. at 922. 
19 Simmons, supra note 13, at 922 (“In England, for example, King Henry I 
declared in 1116 that certain intentional torts—such as arson, robbery, and 
murder—would henceforth be considered crimes.”). 
20 Id. 
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criminal activity and, upon a finding of guilt, the forfeiture of their 
property to the State.21 Despite the creation of this new form of justice, 
private individuals were still responsible for prosecuting criminal 
defendants.22 Thus, while the State profited from the punishment of an 
individual in a criminal action, it did not take on the responsibilities of 
investigating and prosecuting criminal offenders.23 This task remained 
largely in the hands of the citizenry.24 
This private pursuit of criminal justice was prevalent in the United 
States just as it was in England.25 The use of private actors to perform 
criminal justice functions, such as policing and prosecution, continued 
until the nineteenth century.26 While governments began adopting 
some criminal justice functions, the private sector was left to fend for 
itself for the vast majority of criminal prosecutions.27 It was not until 
the Industrial Revolution that state actors began to take over criminal 
justice functions, necessitated by the explosion in urban populations 
and the ensuing increase in crime.28 
As the nineteenth century progressed, the use of public forces to 
conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions spread beyond urban 
centers and into smaller communities.29 By the mid-twentieth century, 
the public’s view of the criminal justice system had dramatically 
changed.30 The perception of the criminal justice system shifted to 
accept its functions as fundamentally public in nature; the expectations 
                                                            
21 Id. One of the reasons this new system of justice emerged was to provide an 
additional source of funding for the state. Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 922–23 (“The watchmen [were] incompetent and poorly trained, which led 
wealthier individuals to hire their own private guards, while the government 
offered large rewards for apprehending criminals . . . .”). 
25 FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 5 (“The United States was much slower 
[than England] to adopt an effective public policing service.”). 
26 Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, 
Accessing Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 692–93 (2006). 
27 Id. (“A well-documented survey of the system of litigation in nineteenth-century 
Philadelphia reveals its poorer enthusiastically invoking the criminal process 
against each other, often for relatively petty offenses that might not attract the 
resources or attention of public authorities today.”). 
28 FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 5. 
29 Simmons, supra note 13, at 923 (“The birth of widespread public policing did 
not occur in Great Britain until 1829, and not in the United States until 1845.”). 
30 Id. 
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were that the government exercised the power to investigate and 
prosecute crimes through professional law enforcement forces and 
prosecutorial offices.31 
As the public nature of criminal investigations and prosecutions 
became the norm, so too did expectations that public actors abide by 
certain rules and standards.32 Thus, the law began imposing more 
restrictions on public actors engaged in criminal justice tasks. These 
restrictions attempted to ensure that the power of the government was 
not abused and that the rights of individuals suspected and accused of 
crimes were protected.33 Yet, even with these restrictions in place, the 
resources and lack of meaningful oversight of public criminal justice 
officials led to severe abuses in the system.34 In the latter half of the 
twentieth century, the public grew increasingly distrustful of public 
law enforcement.35 By the 1980s, a strong movement to become less 
reliant on law enforcement began to take hold in many communities.36 
One basis for the current trend toward privatization stems from the 
public distrust of police and public prosecutors felt in the latter half of 
the twentieth century.37 Corruption, abuses of power, and other 
injustices led to public investigations into law enforcement practices.38 
                                                            
31 Id. 
32 Yeazell, supra note 26, at 694 (noting that the criminal justice process in the 
United States was fundamentally changed by providing representation for 
indigent defendants and controlling “police and prosecutorial behavior through a 
series of interpretations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution.”). 
33 Id. (noting that these developments made for a more fair process, and focused on 
the rights of the defendant rather than the rights crime victims or the public at 
large). 
34 Jerome H. Skolnick & David H. Bayley, Community Policing, 1988 ISSUES & 
PRAC. IN CRIM. JUST. 40 (Dep’t of Just., 1988). 
35 Id. (“The [1968] Commission recognized that animus toward police symbolized 
deeper problems—with the society as a whole and the role of blacks within it, 
and especially with the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice.”). 
36 Simmons, supra note 13, at 911 (“[P]rivate law enforcement 
initiatives . . . ar[o]se from . . . an effort by private citizens to obtain greater and 
more responsive crime control . . . .”); see also Sklansky, supra note 1 at 1220 
(“By the early 1980s, it was apparent that something different had happened: the 
private security industry was growing much faster than public law 
enforcement”). 
37 FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 12 (“Even in the absence of brutality, 
professional policing was viewed by large segments of the minority community 
as cold and cruel.”). 
38 See id. at 11–18. 
96 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 88 
These investigations brought to light many of the abuses the public 
had long suspected inherent in law enforcement agencies and led many 
to turn away from public officials in pursuing criminal justice 
initiatives.39 
The return to privatization of law enforcement also reflects 
dissatisfaction with the results of public policing.40 A failure of public 
law enforcement to adequately address the needs of individual victims, 
and the community as a whole, led the citizenry to look to alternative 
methods to achieve their desired objectives.41 
Another significant motivator behind the current shift toward 
privatization is the availability of funding for law enforcement 
functions.42 During economic downturns, when governments seek to 
limit spending, law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies may have 
limited or reduced budgets that restrict their ability to perform certain 
duties.43 Private actors can often perform these same functions at a 
reduced cost, and so may be tapped to supplement or replace public 
entities.44 Additionally, when public police officers are not available to 
perform police functions, private actors may seek out alternatives to 
public law enforcement to meet their needs.45 
                                                            
39 Skolnick, supra note 34, at 40–41. 
40 Simmons, supra note 13, at 911 (“a failure of the public criminal justice system 
to satisfy the needs of potential and actual crime victims.”). 
41 Id. at 913 (“The public criminal justice system is failing. . . . [A] failure of the 
public system will inevitably lead to the development of a private alternative.”). 
42 Fairfax, supra note 3, at 275–76 (2010) (noting that governmental budget cuts 
directed at prosecutors’ offices led to reduced staffing which in turn diminished 
criminal law enforcement capacity). 
43 Id. at 265 (“In an era of scarce public resources, many jurisdictions are being 
forced to take drastic measures to address severe budgetary constraints on the 
administration of criminal justice.”). 
44 Id. 
45 Simmons, supra note 13, at 924. To be effective, public law enforcement needs 
to meet the needs of the citizenry: 
Primary among these needs is the need to feel safe and secure: if 
the public police are scarce or nonresponsive to crimes being 
committed in a certain company or neighborhood, the company or 
neighborhood will likely respond with its own measures to 
improve security by hiring private guards, contracting with a 
private security firm, forming a neighborhood watch association, 
etc. 
Id. Prior to the creation of public police departments, the ability to secure police 
presence or ensure prosecution was not something with which individual 
citizens concerned themselves. Yeazell, supra note 26, at 696. “In the world 
2013 Watching the Watchers 97 
The current trend toward privatization is most easily observed in 
the American criminal justice system in the areas of punishment and 
law enforcement.46 While some scholars have argued that privatization 
should extend to adjudicative functions, these activities are still largely 
considered inherently public in nature and not delegable to private 
entities.47 Thus, we see private actors having the greatest impact on the 
criminal justice system at the beginning and the end of the criminal 
justice process.48 
Looking first to the increased use of private actors in the 
punishment phase of the criminal justice process, a significant shift has 
occurred over the last several decades toward increased use of private 
prisons.49 As the prison population has dramatically grown, so too has 
the need for more prison space to house those prisoners.50 States with 
limited resources and large bureaucracies have relied more and more 
on private companies to build and operate their prisons.51 These 
private actors can operate without some of the bureaucratic procedures 
                                                                                                                                            
before the socialization of criminal justice, victims had the power to make some 
of these decisions. They did not need to convince a police chief or a district 
attorney to drop murder charges and go after unruly, drunken neighbors; they 
could do so themselves.” Id. 
46 Simmons, supra note 13, at 911. 
47 Id. (“Private criminal law, for example, has grown into an immense industry 
operating completely outside of the public criminal justice system, but it is 
currently limited to the law enforcement stage of the process.”). In some areas, 
however, prosecutorial functions have been placed into the hands of the private 
sector. Fairfax, supra note 3 at 266. 
48 Fairfax, supra note 3, at 266. 
49 Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of 
Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 149–50 (2010) (“At least 35 states and 
the District of Columbia now have private prisons . . . . The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons pays private providers to house approximately 11.5% of federal 
inmates . . . .”). The use of private actors to detain individuals is not limited to 
the criminal justice system. Indeed, in 2007, “Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement housed about 38% of its detainees in privately managed facilities.” 
Id. at 150. 
50 Simmons, supra note 13, at 933 (“[A]pproximately seven percent of prisoners in 
[the United States] are serving time in a privately run correctional facility.”). 
51 Id. at 934–35 (noting that a private prison must conform to statutory and 
constitutional restrictions on confinement and punishment); see also Sigler, 
supra note 49 at 150 (“During the present economic crisis, many states are 
poised to increase their reliance on private prisons.”). 
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associated with publicly operated prisons and are often more cost 
efficient than the public prison system.52 
In addition to the increased use of private actors in the punishment 
phase of the criminal justice process, a trend toward privatization can 
also be seen in the area of law enforcement.53 Private security forces 
have existed throughout modern history.54 The current trend toward 
privatization reflects a growing use of private security to accomplish 
public law enforcement tasks.55 For example, it has become customary 
for businesses to hire private security to deter criminal activity from 
occurring.56 Most people are familiar with the sight of a security guard 
patrolling a company’s offices.57 Businesses also hire private security 
forces to investigate crimes committed against their interests and bring 
those crimes to the attention of public prosecutors.58 The desire to 
prevent and detect crime coupled with the resources available to many 
companies, leads businesses to rely on private law enforcement as a 
more effective and efficient means of protecting business interests.59 
Similarly, neighborhoods with resources at their disposal may hire 
private security forces to patrol their neighborhoods and guard against 
                                                            
52 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 271 (“Private prisons are a prominent example of 
outsourcing in criminal justice at both the federal and state levels.”); see also 
Sigler, supra note 49 at 150 (“[S]tudies have found that private prisons may 
reduce the cost of housing inmates by as much as 15%.”). 
53 Simmons, supra note 13, at 920–21 (“Although the immense breadth of the 
industry makes definite numbers hard to come by, it is undisputed that private 
security officers vastly outnumber public law enforcement officers, and 
spending on private security is approximately double the spending for law 
enforcement.”). 
54 Id. at 919–21. 
55 Id. at 919. The increase in the use of private security to accomplish law 
enforcement tasks is staggering. “Today, the so-called ‘private police’ are 
everywhere: conducting residential security patrols; monitoring shoppers in 
department stores; safeguarding warehouses; patrolling college campuses and 
shopping malls; and guarding factories, casinos, office parks, schools, and 
parking lots.” Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 For example, when Apple, the manufacturer of the iPhone, discovered a 
prototype version of their product was in the hands of a journalist, they enlisted 
their private security forces to investigate the breach and track down the missing 
equipment. See Will Cane, Lost iPhone: SF Police Aided Apple Investigators, 
S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Lost-iPhone-
SF-police-aided-Apple-investigators-2311231.php. 
59 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 274. 
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criminal activity.60 These neighborhood security forces are not 
comprised of public law enforcement officers, but private, for-profit 
officers who seek to accomplish the goals of the neighborhood that 
hired them.61 Typically, these goals are to deter criminal activity 
within the geographic limits of the neighborhood and arrest those 
responsible.62 
The increased use of private security forces presents a number of 
legal challenges. In large part, these challenges involve the lack of 
legal standards and oversight of private security.63 There is little, if 
any, law regarding the training of private security officers, methods by 
which they engage in law enforcement activities, ways in which they 
identify suspects and make arrests, and limitations on the scope of 
their powers.64 Thus, private security officers operate in a gray area of 
the law where few controls govern their conduct and the exercise of 
the powers they have been given.65 Not bound by many of the 
constitutional restraints that restrict public law enforcement, private 
security officers are able to engage in conduct that would lead to the 
exclusion of evidence or dismissal of a criminal case had identical 
conduct been engaged in by a public law enforcement officer.66 
In addition, private actors are often motivated by different 
incentives than those which motivate public law enforcement.67 
Whereas the goal of public law enforcement is to preserve and protect 
public interests, the goals of private security forces are often tied to the 
                                                            
60 Id. at 273 (“[A]ny private police are retained by private communities and 
business groups to serve as an adjunct to the publicly paid and maintained police 
force.”). 
61 Id. at 274 (“The rationale underlying the explosion in the private police presence 
is that public police resources are not sufficient to protect the property and 
personal interests of those segments of society able to afford additional 
security.”). 
62 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1179–80. 
63 See Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 
1451 (2010). 
64 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1227. 
65 Id. at 1166–67 (“[P]rivate security personnel find their conduct governed by a 
hodgepodge of private contract provisions, state and local regulations, and tort 
and criminal law doctrines of assault, trespass, and false imprisonment.”). 
66 See infra, Part IV. 
67 Sigler, supra note 49, at 154. 
100 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 88 
distinct desires and needs of their employers.68 For example, ensuring 
a fair and just criminal justice process is not likely a primary objective 
of most private security actors, but it is a purported goal of public law 
enforcement officers.69 The disparity between the purposes behind 
private law enforcement and public law enforcement can lead to 
concerns about the methods by which private actors conduct their 
investigations and the people whom they target for investigation.70 
But it is not just businesses and neighborhoods with resources that 
have begun to lean more heavily on private actors to accomplish 
public law enforcement goals. Indeed, lower income neighborhoods 
have exhibited a greater disillusion with public law enforcement than 
wealthier segments of the population.71 In addition to dissatisfaction 
with, and distrust of, public law enforcement, neighborhoods with 
fewer resources are often areas in which there are higher crime rates.72 
                                                            
68 Id. (“Private firms and public agencies tend to have different capacities, cultures 
and priorities . . . and respond to different incentives.” (quoting Jody Freeman, 
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 534, 550 (2000))). 
69 Id. at 151. 
70 Id. at 154. (“[T]he fact that public and private providers may be animated by a 
different set of norms and goals gives rise to a range of concerns about the 
privatization of governmental responsibilities.”); see also Sklansky, supra note 
1, at 1191–92 (noting that private policing leads to less public control over law 
enforcement and accountability only to customers, rather than public at large). 
71 See Simmons, supra note 13, at 982–87. A significant concern over the 
increased privatization of law enforcement functions is that this trend provides 
more justice to those with resources at their disposal than those in poorer 
communities. Id. Indeed, well-funded private groups can not only afford their 
own private security forces to deter and detect criminal activity, but can impact 
the criminal laws themselves to most effectively address their community 
concerns. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of 
Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1201 (2008) (listing instances 
where private contractors have been accused of using their influence to achieve 
increased privatization as well as changes in substantive policy). Thus, private 
groups can lobby for laws that affect change. Id. For example, “[b]usiness 
improvement districts—coalitions of business and property owners, many of 
which have their own private security forces—have lobbied municipalities for, 
among other things, aggressive panhandling ordinances.” Id. at 1199. 
72 It should be noted that, while lower-income urban neighborhoods may 
participate community watch programs, such programs are not always effective 
in higher-crime areas. This is attributed to the fact that: 
high-crime areas are often devoid of the social organization that we 
generally associate with definitions of “community.” Field 
experiments have revealed that poor inner-city areas tend not to 
show the gains found in other areas after community policing 
2013 Watching the Watchers 101 
Thus, these communities have found alternative methods to deal with 
the criminal activity that occurs within their geographic confines. 
Without resources to hire private security forces, many communities 
rely upon neighborhood watch programs to aid in the prevention and 
deterrence of criminal activity.73 Much like the use of private security 
forces, use of neighborhood watch programs is not without its own 
challenges. 
III. THE RISE OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAMS 
Neighborhood watch programs have a long history in the United 
States,74 and have grown in popularity since the “community policing” 
efforts of the 1980s.75 The community policing movement attempted 
to change the way in which police met law enforcement goals.76 
Rather than devoting most police resources and attention to more 
severe crimes, community policing efforts by police departments shift 
resources to increased use of foot patrols, community revitalization, 
fostering ties to the communities, and encouraging the involvement of 
community members in crime deterrence.77 By attempting to control 
                                                                                                                                            
interventions are applied—improved satisfaction with police 
service, reduced fear of crime, improvements in perceived quality 
of life. 
FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 14. 
73 See Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal 
Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307, 344 (2006). 
74 See Ivan K. Fong, The Current State of Homeland Security, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1135, 1140 (2011). While the term “neighborhood watch” may be a more recent 
addition to the American vocabulary, communities have historically coordinated 
with public law enforcement to provide security for their neighborhoods. Id. 
(“Americans have long helped to secure their hometowns as well as their 
homeland, from our tradition of civil defense, to more recent efforts like 
neighborhood watches and community-oriented policing initiatives.”); see also 
Skolnick & Bayley, supra note 34, at 4 (“Neighborhood Watch is an American 
invention of the early 1970’s.”). 
75 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 6. 
76 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 49 (2012); 
FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 14 (“Above all, the community policing 
movement amounts to a return to fundamental democratic principles of 
governance: that the police serve the public, that they are accountable to the 
public, and that the public has a voice in determining how the police will serve 
them.”). 
77 FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 12–14. This new trend: 
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smaller-scale crimes in specific communities, it was reasoned that 
larger-scale criminal activity would gain less of a foothold in those 
same communities.78 
One aspect of the community policing movement “promoted 
greater involvement of citizens in the prevention of crime.”79 This 
movement also tied into concerns that communities were becoming 
overly reliant on police protection.80 Neighborhood watch programs 
grew in number as part of the efforts made by police and communities 
to encourage citizen involvement in crime prevention;81 and the 
number of programs continue to increase.82 It is estimated that more 
than forty percent of the population in the United States “live[s] in 
communities covered by neighborhood watch” programs.83 
                                                                                                                                            
meant getting closer to the community, not only to improve 
relations between the police and the community—a worthy end in 
itself—but also to become more familiar with the problems that 
were unique to specific areas and to develop contacts that would 
help the police, in partnership with the public, to both prevent and 
solve crimes. 
Id. at 13. 
78 Garnett, supra note 76, at 49–50. 
79 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 6. 
80 See FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
81 Community policing-like efforts have also become prevalent in the realm of 
national security. For example, to discover potential terrorist activity law 
enforcement has relied heavily on private actors to report suspicious activity. 
Michaels, supra note 63, at 1442–43. This “deputization” of private citizens to 
detect security risks is, in many ways, similar to neighborhood watch patrolling. 
Id. “By and large, the government asks deputies to report on suspicious events 
viewed either in plain sight or in the course of having privileged access to 
private space, privileged access given to the deputies in their commercial 
capacities; or, the government requests access to the deputies’ stores of data.” 
Id. at 1443. In rarer circumstances, private citizens will be asked to intervene 
more directly by “opening suspicious packages [or] independently analyzing 
data patterns for evidence of terrorist activities.” Id. Indeed, the federal 
government sought to institute what amounted to a nationwide neighborhood 
watch program to ferret out suspected terrorist activity; however this program 
was vehemently opposed and ultimately shut down. See Diane Webber, Can We 
Find and Stop the “Jihad Janes”?, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 91, 110 
(2011) (discussing the Department of Justice’s Terrorism Information and 
Prevention System program). 
82 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 6. 
83 Id. Such programs are also popular in England, where more than a quarter of 
residences are part of a neighborhood watch program. Id. 
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The structure of neighborhood watch programs can vary from 
community to community.84 While some programs are initiated and 
guided by police, other programs begin as a grass-roots effort amongst 
the citizenry.85 The connection between law enforcement and 
community watch programs also varies greatly. Some programs have 
strong ties to law enforcement and receive training and financial 
support from law enforcement organizations;86 while other programs 
have minimal ties to law enforcement, receiving little to no training.87 
Still more programs fall in the middle of these two extremes; these 
programs receive materials and have some connection to law 
enforcement organizations, but do not receive substantial training or 
oversight.88 
Because of the variety in neighborhood watch programs, it is 
difficult to attribute one organizational structure to these groups. 
Typically, neighborhood watch programs operate with a “block 
captain” who supervises the program for a specific geographic area.89 
These captains report up to a “block coordinator,” who supervises the 
                                                            
84 Id. at 10–11. 
85 Id. at 10. 
86 Id. at 11 (“The funding of Neighborhood Watch programs is nearly always a 
joint venture between the local police department and the program members 
through their fund-raising activities. The relative contribution of the two sources 
varies considerably.”). 
87 Michael Levin Epstein, Trayvon Martin’s Death Places Increased Attention on 
Neighborhood Watch Groups, QUINLAN L. ENFORCEMENT EMP. BULL., May 
2012, at 1, 2–3 (noting that informal neighborhood watch groups can be 
problematic because of the lack of training and limited contact with police 
departments); see also, e.g., Franklin v. Arkansas, 863 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Ark. 
1993) (“After talking to the owner of the building about a neighborhood watch 
program, Campbell took it upon himself to become a security guard for the area. 
He bought a security guard uniform, a night stick, whistle, mace, and a 
flashlight. On the evening of July 10, 1991, Campbell asked Bryan if he also 
wanted to become involved as a guard. Bryan agreed and pinned a security 
guard patch on his shirt. Bryan took a baseball bat with him when he went out to 
join Campbell on patrol.”), Utah v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah 1998) 
(“The homeowners in the rural Frampton Heights area had an informal 
‘neighborhood watch’ system of keeping an eye on one another’s properties and 
investigating the names, license plate numbers, and activities of strangers seen 
in the area. Harmon, the only year-round resident, participated in the watch and 
reported suspicious tracks or people to the owners of the five other cabins in 
Frampton Heights.”). 
88 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 11. 
89 Id. at 10. 
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watch over all of the areas within that community.90 The coordinator 
often acts as a liaison between the police department and the 
neighborhood watch.91 The size of the area covered by a neighborhood 
watch can also vary significantly, however many programs tend to be 
smaller in order to capitalize on the residents’ knowledge of their 
neighbors and community needs.92 
There are various ways in which these types of programs are 
purported to prevent criminal activity.93 First, the presence of visible 
surveillance might deter potential offenders from committing crimes in 
a particular location.94 Second, the opportunities to commit crimes 
might be reduced because of awareness and precautions taken by a 
more vigilant community.95 Third, community involvement may foster 




92 Id. In addition, meetings of neighborhood watch programs can vary in 
participation. Some such meetings are closed to all but participants in the 
program, while others are open to the public. Id. at 10–11. 
93 See, e.g., MATTHEWS MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 42.59 sec. 3(c) (West 2012) 
(“Crime prevention officers shall encourage and assist in the formation of 
neighborhood watch groups. These groups shall provide opportunities for 
neighbors to know each other, to recognize when a stranger or an unfamiliar 
vehicle is in the neighborhood, to recognize suspicious activities and 
circumstances that may involve burglaries or other crimes, and to report 
suspicious circumstances or activities to the police. Neighborhood watch groups 
shall not be for the purpose of making arrests or doing other police work.”). 
Model municipal ordinances lay out some of the foundational elements of a 
neighborhood watch program, but may diverge widely from these principles in 
practice. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Harrell, No. 11-887, 2012 WL 280658 (La. Ct. 
App. Feb. 1, 2012). 
94 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 14 (“It has been argued . . . that visible surveillance 
might reduce crime because of its deterrent effect on the perceptions and 
decision-making of potential offenders.”). 
95 Id. Neighborhood watch programs may deter crime by reducing opportunities 
for criminal activities by, for example, “creation of signs of occupancy, such as 
removing newspapers from outside neighbor’s homes when they are away, 
mowing the lawn, and filling up trash cans,” all of which can reduce 
opportunities for potential criminal actors to identify empty homes. Id. But, it 
has been noted that “the private deterrence measures that fearful individuals are 
most likely to take—including neighborhood watch groups, alarm systems, extra 
locks, bars on windows, etc.—tend to signal that crime is prevalent in a 
community.” Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land 
Use Policy, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 131, 141 (2010). 
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and by direct intervention of the residents.”96 Finally, neighborhood 
watch programs may affect criminal activity through heightened 
communications between the community and law enforcement. 97 With 
increased communication from the community, police receive more 
information about criminal activity, which may in turn lead to greater 
success arresting and prosecuting criminal actors.98 
It should be noted that it is far from certain that these programs 
actually produce the desired effect, despite commonly held perceptions 
about the ways in which neighborhood watch programs reduce 
criminal activity.99 Studies examining the effectiveness of 
neighborhood watch programs show results that are far from 
compelling100 and are not conclusive regarding their success.101 Yet, 
effective or not, neighborhood watch programs are popular and 
growing in number.102 
Despite their prevalence and popularity, these programs are rife 
with challenges. Lack of training, poor organization, tendencies to 
target certain demographic groups, and overzealous interactions with 
suspects are common complaints regarding neighborhood watch 
programs.103 Yet perhaps the most troubling problem associated with 
                                                            
96 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 14. 
97 Id. at 6 (“The main method by which Neighborhood Watch is supposed to help 
reduce crime is when residents look for and report suspicious incidents to the 
police and thereby perhaps deter potential offenders from committing a crime.”). 
98 Id. at 14 (“An increase in information concerning crimes in progress and 
suspicious persons and events might lead to a greater number of arrests and 
convictions and, when a custodial sentence is passed, result in a reduction in 
crime through the jailing of local offenders.”). See, e.g., Weber v. Bland, No. 97 
C 5227, 1998 WL 341823 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 1998) (neighborhood watch 
members’ tips to police led to arrests). Neighborhood watch programs 
sometimes have access to information on criminal activity similar to that which 
is available to police. For example, a Wisconsin Statute provides that, 
“Neighborhood watch programs are entitled upon request to the names and 
information of all [registered sex offenders] residing, employed, or attending 
school in the ‘community, district, jurisdiction or other applicable geographic 
area of activity.’” Wisconsin v. Schwarz, 630 N.W.2d 164, 179 n.9 (Wis. 2001) 
(citing Wis. Stat. § 301.46(4) (2001)). 
99 HOLLOWAY, supra note 7, at 8 (collecting studies). 
100 Id. at 29 (There is “some evidence that Neighborhood Watch can be effective in 
reducing crime; however, the results of evaluations are mixed and show that 
some programs work well while others appear to work less well or not at all.”). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 6. 
103 See Michaels, supra note 63, at 1435–38. 
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neighborhood watch programs are their tendency to impinge upon the 
civil liberties of those living within the community.104 Without the 
training or oversight that police receive, members of neighborhood 
watch programs often do not have the tools or insight to exercise the 
discretion or restraint that police utilize use to ensure that individuals’ 
rights are protected and constitutional safeguards are followed. 
Indeed, the legal framework that, in many ways, restricts actions 
by law enforcement personnel provides generous loopholes for the 
public acting as members of a neighborhood watch.105 It is these laws 
that allow members of the public to skirt procedural protections 
guaranteed to criminal suspects and lead to the diminution of civil 
liberties. 
IV. LEGAL MECHANISMS THAT EMPOWER NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 
PROGRAMS 
When a police officer investigates a crime, the investigation is 
governed by constitutional principles that restrict the officer’s conduct 
in a myriad of ways. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments all limit an officer’s ability to intrude upon the civil 
liberties of a criminal suspect.106 Further, Supreme Court precedent 
has created additional rules that control an officer’s actions in 
conducting an investigation.107 These limitations purport to prevent 
injustice in the investigative process and protect individuals from 
overly intrusive government conduct. 
When an officer first determines the need to investigate, the officer 
must justify any intrusion into an individual’s freedom of movement 
by certain prescribed standards.108 If an officer wants to detain or 
arrest an individual, further rules govern the circumstances under 
which such detention can be achieved.109 If an officer seeks to search 
                                                            
104 See infra, Part IV. 
105 See Michaels, supra note 63, at 1451 (“Deputy relationships that provide 
something more—e.g., special access or the bypassing of legal restrictions 
imposed exclusively on government actors—pivot in no small part on the 
diffusion, distortion, and re-invention of traditional status designations of the 
private actors-turned-deputies.”). 
106 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1183. 
107 Id. 
108 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1964). 
109 Id. at 21 (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able 
to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
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the individual, their vehicle, or their home, they are restricted in doing 
so by a number of legal doctrines.110 Finally, if the officer wants to 
question the individual they are further limited by procedural rules that 
must be met before an interrogation can occur.111 These legal 
limitations on an officer’s powers are largely the result of nineteenth 
and twentieth century jurisprudence that dealt with a growing public 
police force charged with investigating criminal activity and providing 
for public safety.112 In many ways, these limitations were the direct 
result of abuses by public officials that the law sought to remedy.113 
Yet no such limitations were imposed on private actors conducting 
investigative activities.114 Indeed, constitutional safeguards that govern 
the actions of police engaged in criminal investigations do not apply to 
private actors engaged in the same activities.115 Further, while there 
are no constitutional limitations on private actors engaged in law 
enforcement functions, self-defense doctrines and the right to bear 
arms have been expanded, allowing private citizens greater power to 
conduct police-like activities without the legal restrictions found in the 
rules of criminal procedure. 
A. Constitutional Restrictions on Public Law Enforcement 
The Fourth Amendment and its interpretational jurisprudence 
govern the ability of a police officer to stop an individual.116 Pursuant 
to the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may only stop an individual 
                                                                                                                                            
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the 
Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some 
point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to 
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular 
circumstances.”). 
110 JOSEPH COOK, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 4:1 (3d ed. 
1996). 
111 Id. § 6:14. 
112 See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? 
Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004) (discussing the “criminal procedure revolution”). 
113 Id. at 1372. 
114 Simmons, supra note 13, at 935 (explaining that a private security guard may 
“search a suspect without probable cause or consent . . . and . . . can elicit 
confessions without concern for Miranda rights.”). 
115 See infra Part IV.B. 
116 COOK, supra note 110, § 4:1. 
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under certain, limited circumstances.117 For example, if an officer 
wants to detain an individual, the officer must be able to articulate a 
certain level of suspicion.118 Further, that level of suspicion is not 
merely the subjective belief of the officer, but must hold up to an 
objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding that particular 
detention.119 If the officer desires to go beyond mere detention of the 
individual and arrest the suspect, the officer must either obtain a 
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate or the circumstances 
must satisfy specific enumerated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.120 
The Fourth Amendment also places limits on an officer’s ability to 
conduct searches of a suspect, a suspect’s belongings, a suspect’s 
residence, or a suspect’s vehicle.121 Indeed, search and seizure law is 
an enormous body of jurisprudence designed to guide and limit 
officers’ discretion in conducting searches.122 An officer is only 
permitted to conduct searches if the officer has obtained a warrant or if 
a specific legal exception to the warrant requirement exists.123 Thus, an 
officer may conduct a warrantless frisk of a suspect to search for 
weapons if that officer reasonably believes the suspect is armed and 
dangerous, but may not conduct such a search without this belief nor 
may the officer search for anything other than weapons.124 Further, an 
officer’s ability to search a car is limited by several doctrines that 
restrict the officer’s ability to search the vehicle unless certain 
circumstances are present.125 The list of exceptions to the warrant 
                                                            
117 E.g., Richard E. Myers, II, Challenges to Terry for the Twenty-First Century, 81 
MISS. L.J. 937, 940 (2012). 
118 Id. 
119 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1964). 
120 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1184 (“An officer, as a general matter, may arrest 
anyone [without a warrant] he or she has probable cause to believe has 
committed a felony, and anyone who commits a misdemeanor in the officer’s 
presence.”). 
121 See COOK, supra note 110, § 4:1. 
122 See id. 
123 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2010) (“[T]he basic rule that ‘searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only 
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”). 
124 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25. 
125 See Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity” in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned 
Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 382–90 (1997). 
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requirement is long, and thus provides many ways in which police can 
justify searches without first obtaining a warrant.126 Yet despite the 
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, it is important to 
note that police are still governed by these exceptions, and must 
conform their conduct to the rules prescribed by the courts.127 
Constitutional restrictions further require that police provide 
certain warnings to a suspect in custody before asking that suspect 
questions designed to elicit an incriminating response.128 In addition, if 
the suspect requests the presence of an attorney, the law mandates that 
the police officer cease all questioning until the attorney’s presence is 
obtained.129 The types of questions an officer can ask, and the 
circumstances under which a police officer may ask these questions, 
are also restricted to ensure the voluntariness of any confession 
obtained.130 For example, police may not make certain types of 
promises to obtain incriminating information from a suspect.131 Thus, 
there are numerous rules governing the conduct of police officers 
engaged in criminal investigations. These rules are designed to ensure 
that constitutional safeguards protecting the rights of criminal suspects 
are not violated. 
The enforcement of these rules is primarily accomplished through 
the exclusionary rule, a doctrine whereby evidence obtained illegally 
by police is inadmissible at trial.132 This rule ensures that police do not 
                                                            
126 See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1473–74 (1985). 
127 Id. 
128 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, 
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement 
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive 
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be 
no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner 
that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.”). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984). 
130 COOK, supra note 110, § 6:14. 
131 Id. 
132 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (“The exclusionary rule 
has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either 
during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.”); see also WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE 4 (4th ed 2004). 
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benefit from violating the mandates of the Constitution.133 As the 
Supreme Court stated in Elkins v. United States, the purpose of the rule 
is to deter illegal conduct on the part of the police, thereby 
“compel[ling] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.”134 Further, by preventing fruits of illegal police conduct from 
becoming evidence used to support a conviction, the exclusionary rule 
ensures that the courts do not become a “party to lawless invasions of 
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered 
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.”135 Thus, when 
public law enforcement officers engage in unconstitutional conduct to 
seize evidence, the exclusionary rule bars the use of such evidence at 
trial.136 
Due process guarantees may be protected further by civil actions 
against government agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.137 This statute 
provides that an individual may sue government officials who have 
violated the individual’s civil rights.138 Section 1983 is limited in 
scope, however. First, the plaintiff must prove that he was denied a 
federally protected right by a government official who acted “under 
color of state . . . law.”139 Second, police officers acting within the 
                                                            
133 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) 
(“The exclusionary rule provides redress for Fourth Amendment violations by 
placing the government in the position it would have been in had there been no 
unconstitutional arrest and search.”). 
134 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
135 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1964). 
136 Id. Further, the exclusionary rule also prohibits the use of secondary or 
derivative evidence, obtained as a result of the initial illegal conduct. See 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920). 
137 The statute provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
138 Id. 
139 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). 
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course of their duties are often protected by qualified immunity.140 
Therefore, unless the officer engaged in conduct that is a clear 
violation of established law, the officer will not be liable in a § 1983 
action. These actions also are limited because lawsuits require 
resources that many criminal defendants lack.141 Because of the 
hurdles a criminal defendant must overcome to sustain an action under 
§ 1983, successful actions under this statute are more rare than the 
successful use of the exclusionary rule to remedy the illegal seizure of 
evidence. 
Through these various legal mechanisms, police are faced with 
numerous procedural rules that govern their conduct in any 
investigation. These rules attempt to ensure that police do not impinge 
upon the civil rights of individual suspects and ensure conformity by 
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of criminal 
procedure safeguards. Whether these rules are routinely followed or 
effective is the subject of much scholarly debate. For purposes of this 
article, however, the important point is that procedural safeguards exist 
that limit police conduct while investigating crimes. Therefore, police 
officers must conform their conduct to these constitutional safeguards. 
B. Powers Available to Neighborhood Watch Programs and 
their Members 
It is important to emphasize that it is “public” officers who must 
conform their conduct to the rules of criminal procedure set forth 
above.142 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the application 
of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments are limited to 
governmental conduct.143 Under the state action doctrine, “the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Miranda protections, and the 
underlying guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments 
                                                            
140 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (“The principles of qualified 
immunity shield an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably 
believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.”). 
141 Although, under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976, courts are 
permitted to award attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who successfully bring suit under 
§ 1983. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b) (2012)). 
142 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1183 (“[T]he ‘criminal procedure revolution’ of 
the past half century has left private security largely untouched.”). 
143 See FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 21 (“[Private agents] enjoy the powers 
to arrest, to search for and seize evidence, and to file criminal charges in court, 
but the are not held to due process requirements routinely followed by the 
police, such as those specified in Mapp v. Ohio.”). 
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[are] inapplicable to investigative activity carried out by private 
citizens.”144 Unless the investigating party is a public officer or acting 
pursuant to the direction of a public officer, criminal procedure rules 
that limit the investigator’s conduct and protect individuals’ civil 
rights are inapplicable.145 Thus, because of the state action doctrine, 
private security companies employing guards that patrol businesses 
and neighborhoods are not subject to the same criminal procedure 
rules that govern a police officer’s conduct.146 The actions of a private 
citizen are similarly unrestrained by the constitutional principles which 
                                                            
144 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1229. It is important to note that while much of the 
literature on this issue has focused on the rights of private security guards and 
patrols, in general there is no legal distinction between hired private security 
forces and members of a neighborhood watch patrol. Id. Both are subject to the 
same legal rules and benefit from the lack of clear restrictions on their conduct. 
Id. Constitutional principles apply to the actions of a private security guard or a 
private citizen only when that individual is officially deputized and is acting as 
an agent of the government. Id. at 1229–30. Further, “[v]irtually without 
exception, state constitutional restrictions on criminal investigations are 
similarly limited.” Id. at 1233. Some states, such as Texas, do extend 
constitutional limitations to the actions of private actors. See TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. Art. 38.23 (West 1987). Under the Texas Rules of Criminal 
procedure, any evidence obtained in violation of the law is inadmissible at trial. 
Id. The rule specifically provides: 
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of 
any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or 
of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall 
be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any 
criminal case. 
Id. (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this rule to mean that evidence 
illegally obtained by a private citizen is subject to the exclusionary rule. Miles v. 
Texas, 241 S.W.3d 28, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Gillett v. State, 588 
S.W.2d 361, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Roberts, J., dissenting)). However, 
this extension of constitutional principles to private actors by state law is the 
exception and not the rule. 
145 Simmons, supra note 13, at 929–30 (discussing state action). Courts have 
interpreted the state action doctrine narrowly and have refused to treat private 
citizens as state actors unless they have been formally deputized or are acting at 
the direct behest of a government actor. Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1232 (citing 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see also Flagg Bros. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164–65 (1978). 
146 Simmons, supra note 13, at 930 (“[G]iven the current status of the state action 
doctrine for criminal procedure cases, there is no way to legally distinguish 
between private police and private citizens.”). 
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limit the actions of public officers conducting an investigation.147 It 
follows then that members of a community patrol, engaged in law 
enforcement functions, are not restricted in the same ways that public 
law enforcement officers are limited.148 Indeed, there is little guidance 
on what laws govern community watch members acting in the course 
of their duties.149 Further, there has been an expansion in recent years 
of the self-defense doctrine; this expansion has provided more power 
to private individuals, which directly affects the powers of 
neighborhood watch patrols.150 
1. Detention and Arrest 
Much like a public police officer, a private citizen has certain 
rights to detain and arrest an individual without a warrant.151 Derived 
from historical doctrines that permitted citizen arrests, current legal 
standards permit citizens to detain and arrest individuals under certain 
prescribed circumstances.152 Indeed, the ability of a police officer to 
arrest a suspect without a warrant is not much broader than the ability 
of a private citizen to do the same.153 Most statutes permit a citizen to 
arrest an individual when the citizen observes the individual engaged 
in misdemeanor criminal conduct or has probable cause to believe an 
                                                            
147 Fairfax, supra note 3, at 274 (“Although those apprehended by private police 
officers may be turned over to public authorities for prosecution, most private 
police are not in privity with the state and are not state actors for purposes of 
constitutional remedies.”). 
148 Simmons, supra note 13, at 929 (“Courts have also refused to apply the standard 
Constitutional restrictions on law enforcement . . . to private security forces. 
This refusal is perhaps the most significant area of neglect, as the Constitution is 
the source of all significant limitation on public police powers, regulating how 
the public police conduct investigations, searches, arrests, and interrogations.”). 
149 See id. 
150 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1190–91. 
151 Id. at 1184. 
152 LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 7 (1947) (“At common law, 
arrests might be made either by a private person or by a police officer.”). 
153 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1184 (“[T]he arrest powers of ordinary citizens in 
most states are not strikingly different, in some significant respects, from those 
of police officers.”). Indeed, in the absence of a warrant, the only significant 
difference between a police officer’s arrest power and a private citizen’s arrest 
power is that the private citizen is liable for false arrest if she arrests for a felony 
that later turns out not to have been committed. Id. at 1185. 
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individual has committed a felony.154 Thus, a member of a 
neighborhood watch may detain any individual he or she observes 
engaging in particular criminal activity.155 Because the private 
individual is not restricted by the principles of the Fourth Amendment 
in stopping and arresting an individual, a member of a neighborhood 
watch need not abide by any of the numerous rules governing the 
ability of police to conduct such an arrest.156 Further, if the member of 
the neighborhood watch later turns out to be incorrect in his 
observations, the law does not require that any evidence seized 
pursuant to the arrest be inadmissible.157 Because in most 
circumstances the exclusionary rule does not apply to private 
conduct—even when a private citizen acts in an egregious manner in 
seizing an individual—the exclusionary rule will not prevent the 
admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result.158 
2. Searches 
Similarly, Fourth Amendment guarantees do not apply to searches 
conducted by private citizens.159 Thus, upon stopping a suspect, a 
member of a neighborhood patrol may search the suspect’s person, 
effects, and vehicle, without concern for the applicability of search and 
                                                            
154 Id. at 1184. It should be noted that another way in which private individuals are 
given greater latitude in law enforcement activities is in the discretion they have 
to arrest and seek charges against an individual. “Unlike sworn officers, who are 
bound to file criminal charges when probable cause exists, private security 
personnel have discretion to prosecute offenders . . . .” FORST & MANNING, 
supra note 1, at 21–22. 
155 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1184 (“A private citizen typically may . . . arrest 
for a misdemeanor committed in his or her presence, and for a felony he or she 
has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed—as long as the felony 
has in fact been committed, by the arrestee or someone else.”); see also id. at 
1184–85 n.85 (collecting citizen arrest statutes). 
156 See, e.g., FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 21 (“Private agents have the 
authority to stop and challenge any person, without probable cause, for 
trespassing in a designated private area, and they can make arrests without 
having to give Miranda warnings to arrestees.”). 
157 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (“The papers having 
come into the possession of the government without a violation of petitioner’s 
rights by governmental authority, we see no reason why the fact that individuals, 
unconnected with the government, may have wrongfully taken them, should 
prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an offense where the 
documents are of an incriminatory character.”) 
158 See Simmons, supra note 13, at 929. 
159 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1183. 
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seizure laws or the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of 
those laws.160 As long as the person conducting the search is not acting 
at the behest of a government agent, they need not abide by rules 
governing governmental searches.161 Any item seized in the course of 
a search by a neighborhood watch member would be admissible at trial 
as, again, the exclusionary rule is not applicable to such conduct.162 
3. Interrogation and the Right to Counsel 
The interrogation of a suspect by a citizen-member of a 
neighborhood watch group is also not governed by the principles of 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.163 A member of a neighborhood 
watch need not read a suspect his Miranda rights before questioning 
the suspect, nor need the interrogation cease if the suspect requests an 
attorney.164 Indeed, lower courts have consistently held that the Sixth 
Amendment protection against uncounseled interrogation is 
inapplicable to interrogations by private persons.165 And since the 
information gathered by the neighborhood watch member in the course 
an interrogation would not be subject to the exclusionary rule, the 
information would be admissible in a trial.166 
Just as a private citizen acting in his or her own capacity, the 
member of a neighborhood watch need not conform his or her actions 
to constitutional criminal procedure requirements.167 In some respects, 
this is not overly concerning. Neighborhood watch members do not 
typically exhibit the same indicia of authority as public law 
enforcement officers: they typically do not wear a uniform or badge, 
they do not openly carry weapons, nor do they possess all of the 
powers that public law enforcement officers maintain. For example, 
                                                            
160 See COOK, supra note 110, § 4:1. 
161 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1232. 
162 Id. at 1231–32. 
163 Id. at 1183. 
164 A private citizen acting as a member of a neighborhood watch, is no more 
restricted by these principles than a private security guard, and “suspects 
interrogated by security guards are not entitled to Miranda warnings.” Sklansky, 
supra note 1, at 1183. 
165 Id. at 1233 & n.3 (collecting cases). 
166 Id. at 1232 (“[L]ower courts without exception have refused to impose the 
prophylactic protections of Miranda on private interrogators.”). 
167 Id. at 1233 (“[T]he Due Process Clauses prohibit prosecutions based on 
‘outrageous’ investigative techniques, but only when they are employed by the 
government.”). 
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neighborhood watch members cannot force an individual to stop or 
permit a search, nor can they force an individual to remain in their 
presence for questioning. However, the ability of these private citizens 
to conduct law enforcement activities is particularly troubling, in part, 
because of laws that have expanded upon the ability of individuals to 
carry weapons and to act in self-defense. 
C. Concealed Weapon and Stand Your Ground Statutes 
The powers wielded by private actors acting as members of a 
neighborhood watch are further emboldened by laws that have 
expanded the ability of private citizens to carry weapons and to use 
deadly force in self-defense. 
1. Expansion of Concealed Weapon Legislation 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”168 From early American jurisprudence to modern times, 
courts have consistently affirmed the right of the people to carry 
firearms.169 But the circumstances under which the “People” had the 
right to bear arms have altered dramatically since the eighteenth 
century.170 Early American jurisprudence premised this right on the 
need for armed militias.171 Thus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries those individuals who were part of the military were not only 
permitted to bear arms, but required to do so.172 It was not until the 
twentieth century that scholars began to argue that the Second 
Amendment was the source of an individual right.173 This more recent 
                                                            
168 U.S. CONST. amend II. 
169 Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): 
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. 
U. L. REV. 585, 589 (2012). 
170 ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER 
THE LAW 84 (2001) (noting that up until the second half of the twentieth 
century, the Second Amendment received little attention as it was thought to 
relate to citizen-militias, but a shift in the latter half of the twentieth century has 
led to the interpretation of the amendment to provide an individual right). 
171 Id. at 16–17. 
172 Id. at 17 (noting that early American law required eligible males to own a 
firearm to participate in the militia; the law also barred certain groups, such as 
slaves, from owning firearms). 
173 Id. at 51. In a law review article published in 1960, the argument was first put 
forward that the right to bear arms was an individual right. Id. The argument was 
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development has led to statutes and cases explicitly providing for an 
individual’s right to bear arms.174 This right has not been interpreted to 
be absolute, however, and courts have held that legislatures may 
constitutionally regulate gun ownership in various ways.175 
Historically, many states have limited gun ownership through the 
requirement that a gun owner must receive a permit to carry the 
weapon.176 Through this mechanism, the State regulates and limits 
those individuals that are eligible to own a firearm by heightening the 
burden for obtaining a permit. While some states continue use permits 
to severely restrict gun ownership, most jurisdictions now authorize 
“shall-issue” gun permits, allowing most individuals not specifically 
excluded by statute to own a gun.177 These states grant “presumptive 
carry” rights, which allow individuals “the opportunity, if they so 
choose, to carry defensive weapons in most places and times.”178 
Therefore, in most states, individuals need not have a specific need to 
carry a weapon to do so. This shift away from more restrictive gun 
control laws toward greater rights to bear arms has gained support in 
the last ten years.179 
Another way that states regulate gun use is to limit the method by 
which an individual can carry a weapon.180 In early American 
jurisprudence, laws permitting individuals to carry guns mandated that 
the weapon must be carried openly.181 This is in dramatic contrast to 
current legislation in many states authorizing individuals to carry 
                                                                                                                                            
“that the Second Amendment supported an individual or personal right to have 
firearms, in particular for personal self-defense, separate and apart from citizen 
service in a government militia.” Id. at 51 (citing Stuart R. Hays, The Right to 
Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 
(1960)). 
174 See O’Shea, supra note 169, at 593 n.24 (2012) (“[N]early all American 
jurisdictions authorize private individuals to carry handguns in public in at least 
some limited circumstances . . . .”). 
175 Id. at 592–93. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 599 (“Thirty-five states make available shall-issue handgun carry permits. 
Four more states dispense with a permit requirement . . . .”). 
178 Id. at 595. 
179 Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law, Policy, and Politics, N.Y. ST. B.A.J., Jul./Aug. 
2012, at 35, 35–36. 
180 O’Shea, supra note 169, at 596. 
181 Id. 
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concealed weapons.182 Indeed, some states have barred the open 
display of guns entirely and mandated that weapons must be carried in 
a concealed manner.183 Since the 1990s, more and more states have 
allowed individuals to carry concealed weapons; more than forty states 
currently authorize concealed-carry permits for gun owners.184 
This shift away from more restrictive gun regulation to more 
permissive laws has led to an increase in gun ownership.185 Indeed, 
while a precise number is hard to ascertain, approximately one in 
every three Americans own a gun.186 This shift further reflects a 
change in the ability of citizens to use force for self-protection.187 
Individuals armed with weapons can use those weapons to defend 
themselves and their homes. Further, individuals organized as 
members of neighborhood watch programs may use weapons to 
protect themselves as they patrol their communities.188 Whether 
openly carrying weapons, or carrying a concealed weapon, a 
neighborhood watch member is empowered through his ability to 
wield a firearm. 
This practice, and the problems associated with it, is highlighted by 
the facts of the Trayvon Martin case. George Zimmerman, who shot 
Martin, carried a semi-automatic handgun while patrolling his 
                                                            
182 See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of 
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 681 (1995). 
183 James Bishop, Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry after Heller, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 907, 924 (2012). 
184 Id. at 910 (“In a stunning cultural sea-change that began in the early 1990s, 
demand for concealed-carry permits exploded in popularity across the nation, 
and today more than forty states issue permits to anyone who meets the 
relatively modest eligibility criteria.”). 
185 See Lydia Saad, Self-Reported Gun Ownership in U.S. Is Highest Since 1993, 
GALLUP (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150353/Self-Reported-
Gun-Ownership-Highest-1993.aspx. 
186 Id. 
187 FORST & MANNING, supra note 1, at 15 (“Laws permitting private citizens to 
carry concealed weapons became increasingly popular in the 1990s. The police 
no longer monopolize public safety.”). 
188 See, e.g., People v. Rios, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1998), review 
granted and opinion superseded sub nom. People v. Ramirez Rios, 962 P.2d 169 
(Cal. 1998), aff’d, 2 P.3d 1066 (Cal. 2000) (neighborhood watch block captain 
charged with murder and acquitted, but convicted of voluntary manslaughter on 
retrial). 
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neighborhood as a member of a neighborhood watch.189 During the 
course of his patrol, Zimmerman confronted Martin.190 While at the 
time of this writing the facts of this case have yet to be determined in a 
court of law, what is known is that Zimmerman ultimately used his 
weapon against Martin, an unarmed teenager, killing him.191 
Permissive gun ownership laws and the ability of private actors to 
carry concealed weapons has led to the ability of neighborhood watch 
members to use such weapons in confrontations with suspects. Further, 
stand your ground laws have expanded upon the legal defenses 
available to actors who use those weapons in the course of their 
neighborhood watch duties. 
2. Stand Your Ground Legislation 
The powers of a private individual to use force against another has 
also greatly expanded through the doctrine of self-defense; 
specifically, stand your ground laws that allow for an individual to use 
deadly force against another when attacked, regardless of whether the 
individual has the ability to retreat. At its foundation, the doctrine of 
self-defense permits an individual to respond to an attacker with 
force.192 This right is limited in that initial attack must be imminent 
and the response must be necessary and proportional.193 However, as 
long as those limitations are met, self-defense permits an individual to 
use force, even deadly force, in response to an attack.194 
In English common law, self-defense was an excuse available in 
certain cases but required the Sovereign’s pardon.195 Self-defense was 
generally disfavored by English jurists and thus limitations were put in 
                                                            
189 Dennis A. Henigan, The Woollard Decision and the Lessons of the Trayvon 
Martin Tragedy, 71 MD. L. REV. 1188, 1189 (2012). 
190 Id. at 1202. 
191 Id. at 1189. See also Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Zimmerman v. State, No. 
5D12-3198, 2012 WL 3776782 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. Aug. 13, 2012); Response to 
Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Zimmerman v. State, No. 5D12-3198, 2012 WL 
3776807 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. Aug. 23, 2012). 
192 P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle 
Association-Inspired Statues: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand 
Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 1–2. 
195 Id. at 5–6. 
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place on its applicability.196 One such limitation was the duty to 
retreat.197 In English common law, a defendant must have “retreated 
until his back was ‘to the wall’” to successfully raise the defense.198 
The doctrine of self-defense was also incorporated into early 
Anglo-American common law, as was the duty to retreat under the 
doctrine.199 Yet “[d]espite the significant precedent establishing the 
duty to retreat in the English and Anglo-American common law, there 
was a dramatic movement to abandon the duty in the United States 
during the late nineteenth century.”200 The movement to abandon the 
duty to retreat is often attributed to a unique early-American mindset 
that is known as the “true man” ideal: a true man need not retreat when 
attacked by another. Thus, if an individual was attacked by another, 
the “true man” principle would permit him or her to respond with 
deadly force without being criminally liable for his or her actions.201 
Despite this nineteenth century movement to abandon the duty to 
retreat, the duty remains a significant part of modern American 
jurisprudence on self-defense. Over time, however, this duty has been 
narrowed in numerous ways.202 The most broadly adopted exception to 
the duty to retreat is commonly referred to as the “‘Castle 
Doctrine.’”203 Under this doctrine, an individual may defend himself 
within his own home without a duty to retreat.204 Over time, this 
doctrine has been expanded by many states to include the curtilage of a 
home.205 Other states have expanded the castle doctrine to include 
vehicles.206 Thus, the expansion of this doctrine has increasingly 
allowed individuals to be able to exercise deadly force without first 
                                                            
196 Benjamin Levin, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010). 
197 Id. 
198 Ross, supra note 192, at 5–6. 
199 Levin, supra note 196, at 529. 
200 Id. 
201 Levin, supra note 196, at 529. 
202 Ross, supra note 192, at 1–3. 
203 Id. at 12. 
204 Id. at 12–13. 
205 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (“The curtilage concept 
originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a 
dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded 
the house itself.”). 
206 Ross, supra note 192, at 28 (noting that Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, and South 
Dakota have all extended the castle doctrine to apply to vehicles). 
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retreating when attacked outside of their home; specifically, an 
individual can use deadly force when attacked in the area surrounding 
his home or in his car.207 
The more recent trend has been to expand the castle doctrine much 
further—nearly doing away with the duty to retreat altogether. The 
recent trend abandons the duty to retreat in public places where the 
individual has a right to be.208 This expansion invokes some of the 
“true man” arguments of the latter part of the nineteenth century and 
grounds itself in the principle that an individual need not avoid a 
confrontation with an unprovoked attacker so long as that individual is 
rightfully in a public place.209 Statutes reflecting this expansion of the 
castle doctrine are often referred to as “stand your ground” laws.210 
Stand your ground legislation has been considered in well over half 
of the states in the country and has been adopted in twenty-four 
states.211 In states that have adopted stand your ground statutes, 
“defendants need only show that they were not the first aggressor and 
had a legal right to be in the location where they remained; if those 
conditions are met, they have no duty to retreat and may meet ‘force 
with force.’”212 
Other protections of the right to self-defense have been 
incorporated into these stand your ground laws. For example, in 
Alabama, if the use of deadly force is justified, the defendant who used 
such force and stood his ground is immune from both criminal and 
civil liability.213 Further, Alabama law places the burden on law 
enforcement to make an initial determination as to whether the use of 
deadly force was justified; a suspect may only be arrested if there is 
                                                            
207 Id. 
208 Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1455, 1461 (2010). 
209 Levin, supra note 196, at 529. 
210 Ross, supra note 192, at 2. 
211 See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-
Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 663 (2003) (“Most jurisdictions do not impose 
the duty to retreat on one who is unlawfully attacked, whether in public or 
private space . . . .”); Cora Currier, The 24 States That Have Sweeping Self-
Defense Laws Just Like Florida’s, PRO PUBLICA, (Mar. 22, 2012 12:05 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-23-states-that-have-sweeping-self-defense
-laws-just-like-floridas. 
212 Braman, supra note 208, at 1461. 
213 Ross, supra note 192, at 22–23 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d) (as amended 
through Act 303, sec. 1, 2006 Ala. Acts 638, 640 (2006))). 
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probable cause to find that the use of such force was unlawful.214 By 
shifting the defendant’s burden to defend his actions onto the state to 
determine whether a defense exists, Alabama’s stand your ground 
statute gives defendants a much greater chance at success in asserting 
this defense. 
Courts have often interpreted stand your ground statutes quite 
broadly, providing defendants greater protection under this defense.215 
For example, in Florida, an appellate court held that the stand your 
ground statute allows a defendant to use deadly force “even if other 
means of self-protection are available, and . . . even if the attacker is 
unarmed.”216 Thus, the use of the stand your ground defense has been 
successful in circumstances where the law historically would not allow 
for the use of deadly force to respond to an attacker. 
The broadening of self-defense and gun ownership laws has led to 
private citizens wielding greater powers against one another. This 
empowerment extends to members of neighborhood watch programs. 
When confronted by a suspect while on a neighborhood patrol, in most 
states, the member of the patrol may not only be carrying a firearm but 
may use it against the suspect should the member feel attacked—even 
if the suspect later turns out to have been unarmed and innocent of any 
criminal conduct. 
The Trayvon Martin case demonstrates the problem with this 
paradigm. While on patrol for his neighborhood watch program, 
George Zimmerman shot and killed Martin, an unarmed teenager.217 
Because of Florida’s expansive stand your ground statute, Zimmerman 
was not initially arrested by police.218 Indeed, Zimmerman was not 
arrested for several weeks and not until there was a significant public 
outcry against the failure to charge him with a crime.219 Even though 
Zimmerman was eventually arrested and charged with second-degree 
murder, charges against him may still be dismissed following a 
                                                            
214 Id. at 23 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(e)). 
215 Pearl Goldman, Criminal Law: 2007–2010 Survey of Florida Law, 35 NOVA L. 
REV. 95, 106–110 (2010) (surveying recent decisions interpreting Florida’s 
stand your ground statute). 
216 Id. at 107 (citing McWhorter v. State, 971 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007)). 
217 See sources cited supra notes 9, 189. 
218 Curt Anderson, Zimmerman Will Seek ‘Stand Your Ground’ Hearing, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/09
/zimmerman-stand-your-ground_n_1759532.html. 
219 Id. 
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hearing on his defense under the stand your ground Statute.220 The 
Trayvon Martin case clearly shows the powers available to 
neighborhood watch members through expansive gun ownership laws 
and stand your ground legislation—and the tragic consequences that 
can result. 
Because of the power wielded by private citizens engaged in law 
enforcement functions and the lack of restrictions on the conduct of 
neighborhood watch associations, actions of neighborhood watch 
members may lead to significant concern about due process 
protections and the fairness of the criminal justice process as a whole. 
D. Problems Posed by the Powers Available to Neighborhood 
Watch Members 
This right to “stand your ground” against an attacker as well as the 
increasing number of laws protecting the right to carry a weapon have 
led to a citizenry that may use deadly force in numerous 
circumstances.221 But perhaps nowhere is this more concerning than in 
situations where that citizenry has taken on law enforcement duties. 
The existence of neighborhood watch patrols made up of untrained 
citizens, armed and empowered but without constitutional limitations 
on their behavior, will likely lead to a failure to adequately protect the 
civil liberties of individuals confronted by such patrols. 
While concerns over a single, vigilant neighbor, keeping a 
watchful eye out for criminal activity may not pose many concerns, 
legitimate concerns for civil liberties do arise when that neighbor joins 
an organized group charged with protecting the neighborhood and is 
allowed to carry a concealed weapon and to refuse to back down in a 
confrontation. Certainly, a suspect can refuse to answer questions or 
have his person searched by a member of a neighborhood watch, and 
can walk away at will. But when that neighborhood watch member 
carries a weapon and is authorized to defend himself with deadly force 
                                                            
220 Id. 
220 Id.; see also Rene Stutzman and Jeff Weiner, George Zimmerman Judge, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 2012, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-10-
26/news/os-george-zimmerman-gag-order-20121026_1 (“[The Judge] also set 
Zimmerman’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ hearing for late April [of 2013]. At that 
hearing, she must decide whether he shot Trayvon because he had a reasonable 
fear of great bodily injury or death.”). 
221 See, e.g., Boget v. Texas, 40 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding 
that a member of a neighborhood watch could assert self-defense when he 
damaged the windshield of a car whose driver appeared to be intoxicated, but 
later turned out to be sober). 
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should a confrontation ensue, the power of the neighborhood watch to 
coerce a suspect into stopping or permitting a search greatly 
increases.222 
Further, because private actors have total discretion in determining 
whom to investigate and against whom to seek criminal sanctions, 
there is concern that those private actors are engaging in behavior that 
may violate the due process and equal protection rights of those 
suspects.223 Bias against certain demographic groups is a problem that 
has long plagued public law enforcement entities.224 Police 
departments and prosecutorial offices have attempted to remedy this 
concern through various methods.225 Procedural rules have attempted 
to limit the use of racial profiling by law enforcement officers.226 
While such conduct certainly still occurs, the race or ethnicity of an 
individual, by itself, cannot provide suspicion to stop or detain that 
individual.227 Police departments have also invested in training and 
educational programs designed to attack biases within the department, 
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racial profiling policy that complies with the United States Constitution”). 
227 Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited 
Use and Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 219, 224–26 (2005) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976)). See also Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid is Never a 
Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of 
Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 117–18 (2012) (discussing Arizona v. 
U.S., 132 S.Ct 2492 (2012); noting that the Court upheld an Arizona law that 
critics say causes racial profiling). 
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the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such programs is a matter of 
debate. 228 For purposes of this article, the important point is that there 
have been attempts at limiting the impact of bias on law enforcement 
personnel. 
Unfortunately, the same limiting attempts do not exist in the realm 
of private law enforcement. While private security companies may 
decide to train their guards on unbiased ways of targeting suspects, 
such training is not legally required.229 As such, neighborhood watch 
members are less likely to receive such training. Burdened by (and 
perhaps unaware of) their own individual biases, coupled with the lack 
of procedural safeguards or training, neighborhood watch members 
may act on their biases and target individual suspects on the basis of 
race or ethnicity.230 The targeting of individuals based on such 
improper considerations raises significant due process and equal 
protection concerns, and is yet another reason to reexamine the powers 
conveyed upon private citizens engaged in law enforcement 
activities.231 
                                                            
228 See Sean Childers, Discrimination During Traffic Stops: How an Economic 
Account Justifying Racial Profiling Falls Short, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1025, 1043 
& n.85 (2012) (noting that policy measures may not remedy racial profiling 
which arises out of discretionary police functions). 
229 Indeed, when police departments have created anti-bias policies or training 
programs, they often did so in response to a very powerful economic motivator: 
litigation. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of 
the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal 
Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1278 n.14 (2004). Save for 
limited circumstances, such as employment practices or federally funded 
projects, racial profiling is “perfectly legal” in the private sector. Nelson Lund, 
The Conservative Case Against Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism, 66 
ALB. L. REV. 329, 333–36 (2003). 
230 See Braman, supra note 208, at 1479 (noting that implicit bias is difficult to 
identify and remedy because it “works not through overt reference to or 
conscious consideration of race, but rather through subtle effects on cognition 
that subtly shape actors’ perceptions and reactions”). 
231 In the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin shooting, much attention was directed at 
the reason he was identified as “suspicious” by a neighborhood watch volunteer. 
Media reports speculated that George Zimmerman likely targeted Martin 
because he was a young African-American male wearing a hooded sweatshirt. 
Robin Givham, Hoodies, Trayvon Martin, and America’s Racial Fears, THE 
DAILY BEAST, (Mar. 29, 2012 12:39 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles
/2012/03/29/hoodies-trayvon-martin-and-america-s-racial-fears.html. This 
coverage sparked further national debate over what should be considered 
“suspicious.” Peter Grier, Trayvon Martin case: Is Hoodie a Symbol of Menace 
or Desire for Justice?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Mar. 26, 2012) http://www
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Through the expansion of self-defense laws and individual rights 
to bear arms, private citizens engaged in law enforcement duties as 
members of a neighborhood watch wield power and authority that 
nears the powers exercised by police officers.232 Yet these 
neighborhood watch groups are not restricted in any way by the 
constitutional limitations that govern the actions of public law 
enforcement officers.233 This is not to say that there are no limitations 
on the private exercise of power in this context, but it is to say that the 
limitations in place are ineffective and fail to address the enormity of 
the potential problem. 
E. Limitations on Private Actors 
Individual members of a neighborhood watch and the 
neighborhood watch organization are not immune to liability for 
illegal or tortious conduct merely because they are acting as members 
of a private law enforcement group. Neighborhood watch members 
may be criminally prosecuted or sued civilly for illegal conduct.234 
Thus, if a member uses force to stop an individual the member could 
be prosecuted for assault or false imprisonment.235 Further, if the 
                                                                                                                                            
.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0326/Trayvon-Martin-case-Is-hoodie-a-
symbol-of-menace-or-desire-for-justice-video. However, the fact is that with no 
law to govern the conduct of neighborhood watch organizations, these 
community members can use whatever criteria they like in identifying suspects. 
While Zimmerman was ultimately charged with murder in connection with 
Martin’s death, less egregious civil rights violations are unlikely to get the 
attention of police and prosecutors. 
232 See Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful 
Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 222, 246, n. 95 (2012) (“With the 
constitutionalization of personal gun ownership, a proliferation of ‘stand your 
ground’ laws, and a possible rise of a vigilante mentality as government services 
are cut back, such cases may create substantial questions of justice.”). 
233 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1168. Some advocates of criminal justice reform have 
argued that the rules and limitations imposed upon private actors are the same 
rules that should be used in the context of public law enforcement. These 
advocates have argued that the legal regime governing public actors should be 
“deconstitutionalized, defederalized, tort based, and heavily reliant both on 
legislatures and juries.” Id. 
234 Id. at 1183 (“The main legal limitations on the private police today are tort and 
criminal doctrines of assault, trespass and false imprisonment . . . .”). 
235 Id. (“[A]rrests or detentions not authorized by state law generally will expose a 
security guard to civil and criminal liability for false imprisonment and, if force 
is involved, for assault.”). Further, a suspect who resists arrest by a public police 
officer can be charged with a crime. No such crime exists for resisting a 
citizen’s arrest. Id. at 1187. 
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member searches property without the owner’s consent, the member 
could be prosecuted for criminal trespass.236 Any myriad of criminal 
laws could be used to punish the behavior of a neighborhood watch 
member who reaches beyond the scope of conduct permissible for 
private citizens. 
Neighborhood watch members and the organization itself could 
also be sued for tortious conduct.237 While State actors often have 
immunity from suit for conduct occurring in the course of their official 
duties, no such immunity extends to private actors.238 Thus, an 
individual whose rights were violated by a neighborhood watch has the 
ability to sue the members and the organization under common law 
tort doctrines.239 
Despite these two avenues for relief, the remedies available to 
individuals whose rights were violated by a neighborhood watch are 
often ineffective and inefficient. Criminal prosecutions of 
neighborhood watch members are unlikely to occur except in the most 
egregious of circumstances; circumstances where the member’s 




238 Id. at 1186. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Anderson, 785 A.2d 726, 739 (Md. 2001) 
(holding that an off-duty police officer working as a security guard is not 
entitled to public official immunity in a personal injury suit brought by hotel 
who was struck by a stray bullet during a robbery). Even in Michigan, where 
there is private security guard licensing statute, the courts have held that 
“nowhere in the statute does the Legislature provide that a private security guard 
is immune from Michigan laws. People v. Biller, 239 Mich. App. 590, 594 
(2000). 
239 E.g., Turnage v. Kasper, 704 S.E.2d 842, 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (landowner 
sued members of neighborhood watch for malicious prosecution, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation). On the other hand, a suit for 
violating an individual’s civil liberties under § 1983 will not succeed against 
members of a neighborhood watch because they are not state actors. See, e.g., 
Ben v. Garden District Ass’n., Civ. Action No. 12-174 (E.D. La. June 22, 2012) 
(dismissing § 1983 suit by plaintiff who was forcibly detained and handcuffed 
by neighborhood watch); Spetalieri v. Kavanaugh, 36 F. Supp. 2d 92 (N.D.N.Y 
1998). Spetalieri involved a § 1983 action against law enforcement officials and 
members of a neighborhood watch group for taping phone the plaintiff’s phone 
conversations and disseminating the tapes. Id. at 102. The court dismissed the 
claims against the neighborhood watch member because “participation in a 
neighborhood watch group does not transform her actions into state action.” Id. 
at 103. 
240 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1186 (“Successful criminal prosecutions in 
[instances of false arrest] appear virtually nonexistent.”). 
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enforcement officials can benefit from the illegal activities of these 
neighborhood watch members.241 When a neighborhood watch 
member conducts an illegal search and obtains evidence that will later 
be used at trial, the police and prosecutor benefit from that search 
without the penalty of having it declared inadmissible under the 
exclusionary rule.242 Similarly, when a neighborhood watch member 
coerces a suspect into confessing without receiving his or her Miranda 
warnings or a requested lawyer, public law enforcement officials 
benefit from the member’s conduct, and will likely be able to enter 
that admission into evidence at trial.243 
A civil suit is also unlikely to be an effective remedy for conduct 
that violates an individual’s civil rights under these circumstances. Just 
as a criminal suspect is unlikely to have the resources or knowledge to 
file a § 1983244 action against a public officer who violates his or her 
civil liberties, it follows that a suspect would also be unlikely to file 
such an action against private individuals who encroach upon his civil 
liberties.245 In addition, even if an individual has the resources to take 
the case to trial and has the evidence to support liability, the likely 
recovery in such a case is typically quite small.246 Thus, there is not 
great financial incentive for an individual to file a civil suit to recover 
for civil rights violations committed by private neighborhood watch 
members. In addition, if the illegally obtained evidence results in a 
criminal conviction, the defendant’s success in a civil action against 
the private actor will not overturn the conviction. Exclusion of 
evidence—a remedy available to defendants in criminal prosecutions 
where the police acted illegally—is not a remedy available to 
                                                            
241 Fairfax, supra note 3, at 274; see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 
(1921). 
242 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, No. 2:10-cr-36-FtM-36DNF, 2010 WL 
3156559, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2010) (demonstrating that neighborhood 
watch programs can provide information to police that enables them to obtain 
search warrants); State v. Smith, 663 So. 2d 845, 847 (La. Ct. App. 1995) 
(same). 
243 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1183. 
244 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
245 Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REV. 841, 
872 (1996) (citing Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law 
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284 (1988)). 
246 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1185–86 (noting that the low recovery “may explain 
why such cases appear to be rare”). 
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defendants who claim evidence was illegally seized by a private 
actor.247 
V. IMPOSING LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 
ACTIVITIES 
As noted above, current legal restrictions on private citizens 
engaged in law enforcement duties are not effective to address the 
potential problems posed by such activities. The powers available to 
private citizens engaged in law enforcement functions are in many 
ways as great as those available to public law enforcement officers. 
Yet, constitutional safeguards that restrict the behavior of government 
actors engaged in law enforcement activities do not limit the conduct 
of private citizens. As neighborhood watch programs continue to grow 
in popularity, and laws governing the ownership of guns and 
acceptable conduct to defend one’s self grow more permissive, it is 
easy to see potential problems that could arise. 
Indeed, in February 2012, the shooting death of an African-
American teenager by a neighborhood watch member in Florida 
sparked a national debate over neighborhood watch programs as well 
as the legitimacy of stand your ground laws.248 This incident is an 
extreme example of what can happen when private citizens are 
engaged in law enforcement activities without the restrictions and 
training of police officers. But even the less extreme results present 
significant concerns about fairness in the criminal justice process. 
Unreasonable detentions, illegal searches, and coerced confessions all 
can result from a neighborhood watch member acting to detect and 
prevent crime in their community. All of these circumstances lead to 
concerns about the erosion of due process protections and the violation 
of civil rights. Limitations need to be put in place to restrict the ability 
                                                            
247 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1186 (“[E]vidence generated by an illegal arrest by a 
police officer is, as a general matter, inadmissible against a criminal defendant; 
the fruits of private illegality are not similarly excluded.”). 
248 See Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Case Reveals Confusion Over How Stand 
Your Ground Works, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2012), http
://www.csmonitor. com/USA/Justice/2012/0411/Trayvon-Martin-case-reveals-
confusion-over-how-Stand-Your-Ground-works; Florida’s Stand Your Ground 
Law: Investigation, TAMPA BAY TIMES, http://www.tampabay.com/stand-your-
ground-law/ (last updated Dec. 19, 2012); Eyder Peralta, Trayvon Martin Killing 
Puts ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law In Spotlight, NPR.ORG (Mar. 19, 2012 5:15 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/03/19/ 148937626/trayvon-martin-
killing-puts-stand-your-ground-law-in-spotlight. 
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of neighborhood watch members to wield these powers and ensure a 
fairer system of law enforcement. 
The most drastic solution to the problem presented is the 
abandonment of the state action doctrine. By limiting constitutional 
safeguards to conduct of government actors, the state action doctrine 
fails entirely to address private actors engaged in law enforcement 
activities.249 This failure becomes all the more egregious when 
examined in light of the growing privatization of law enforcement 
functions.250 While more and more private actors are performing the 
tasks previously associated with police officers, constitutional 
safeguards have not been extended to the conduct of private actors. 
Abandonment of the state action doctrine, or a significant 
curtailment of the principles behind it, would allow the procedural 
rules derived from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to extend 
to conduct engaged in by private law enforcement personnel. This 
would ensure that due process rights were protected, regardless of 
whether a person acting as a law enforcer is doing do publicly or 
privately. Rejection of the state action doctrine would more adequately 
ensure the overall fairness of criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
The rights of criminal suspects would be better protected by limiting 
the use of illegally obtained evidence and by providing a more 
meaningful remedy to those suspects whose rights have been violated 
by private law enforcement. 
However, abandonment of a doctrine so entrenched in American 
constitutional law is unlikely. A far more practical solution to the 
problems presented by neighborhood watch associations would be 
state legislation the addresses and properly limits the powers and 
abilities of neighborhood watch associations and their members. 
Currently, there are few, if any, laws governing the activities of 
neighborhood watch associations. This absence has allowed private 
actors to act as law enforcers without oversight, training, or governing 
rules. Legislation that limits the ability of a private citizen acting as a 
member of a group tasked with detecting and preventing crime and 
engaged in law enforcement activities would better ensure that due 
process guarantees are met even though the actor is not a public 
officer. 
Any number of statutory provisions could help to restrict the 
activities of neighborhood watch members and therefore better protect 
                                                            
249 See discussion supra, Part IV.B. 
250 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1229–30. 
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the rights of individual suspects. For example, statutory law could 
limit the ability of neighborhood watch groups to carry weapons while 
on patrol. This would lessen the coercive power of neighborhood 
watch members and might reduce the number of illegal detentions, 
searches, and interrogations. Such legislation might also diminish the 
likelihood of deadly interactions between neighborhood watch 
members and suspected wrongdoers. 
Further, statutes could limit the ability of neighborhood watch 
members to confront suspects in the course of their duties. While some 
neighborhood watches instruct members to avoid confrontation and 
limit actions to observation and reporting,251 no statutes mandate this. 
By preventing members from engaging with suspects while on patrol, 
such statutes would limit the opportunity for neighborhood watch 
organizations to impinge upon the due process rights of individuals. 
Further still, statutes could encourage criminal prosecution of 
neighborhood watch members who engage in illegal activities by 
mandating arrest under certain prescribed circumstances. This would 
discourage members from taking the law into their own hands or 
engaging in criminal activity to find evidence of a crime or prevent a 
suspect from leaving the scene of the crime. Statutes could also reduce 
the burdens on those seeking to file a civil suit for the tortious actions 
of a neighborhood watch member. 
In addition, statutes could provide certification of neighborhood 
watch programs, mandating a certain amount of training to participate 
in law enforcement activities. That training could involve anything 
from exploration and rejection of bias in targeting suspects to the 
appropriate use of weapons while on patrol. 
Finally, perhaps the most effective statutory remedy would be to 
extend the exclusionary rule to cover evidence illegally seized by 
anyone, not just State actors. Indeed, one State, Texas, currently has 
such a law in place.252 Texas extended the exclusionary rule to apply 
                                                            
251 Nat’l Sheriff’s Ass’n., USA on Watch—National Neighborhood Watch 
Program, Neighborhood Watch Manual, at 22 (2010), https://www.bja.gov
/Publications/NSA_NW_Manual.pdf (“Community members only serve as the 
extra ‘eyes and ears’ of law enforcement. They should report their observations 
of suspicious activities to law enforcement; however, citizens should never try to 
take action on those observations. Trained law enforcement should be the only 
ones ever to take action based on observations of suspicious activities.”). 
252 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 1987). While the 
legislature has since considered eliminating this expansion of the exclusionary 
rule, it has never acted to change the rule, and thus it remains a part of the Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure. See Robert O. Dawson, State-Created 
132 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 88 
to evidence illegally seized by private citizens as a direct response to 
concerns about vigilantism and the lack of constitutional restrictions 
on private individuals engaged in law enforcement activities.253 
While the exclusionary rule typically only leads to the exclusion of 
evidence illegally seized by government actors, or those acting at the 
direction of government officials, an expansion of the rule to generally 
cover those engaged in law enforcement duties would better protect 
due process guarantees.254 While this rule, by itself, might not deter 
private individuals from engaging in illegal conduct to obtain 
evidence, it would prevent the police and prosecutors from benefitting 
from illegally seized evidence obtained through these means. Thus, the 
use of illegally obtained evidence to convict an individual would be 
prohibited, regardless of its source, thereby protecting due process 
guarantees and ensuring a fairer criminal justice process. Further, 
expansion of the exclusionary rule would provide defendants with a 
meaningful remedy to violations of their civil rights. While damages 
resulting from a civil action or prosecution of the neighborhood watch 
member might provide some relief to a defendant whose rights have 
been violated, a more important remedy would be to prevent the fruits 
of such illegal conduct from supporting a conviction in the first place. 
Because of the lack of statutes governing private criminal justice 
actors, neighborhood watch members act outside of the constraints of 
most criminal justice principles. Without guidance or restrictions, 
these citizens are able to exercise great powers without the 
constitutional restrictions imposed upon those who are employed by 
the state. Yet neighborhood watch members perform many of the same 
functions as public law enforcement personnel. For these reasons, 
restrictions on their activities are necessary to ensure that they do not 
                                                                                                                                            
Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure: A Study of the Texas Experience, 59 
TEX. L. REV. 191, 195–96 (1981). 
253 Adam M. Gershowitz, Is Texas Tough on Crime but Soft on Criminal 
Procedure?, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31 (2012). As Professor Gershowitz notes, in 
1925, the Texas legislature enacted an exclusionary rule in response to concerns 
about vigilantism. Id. at 47. These concerns specifically dealt with private 
citizens engaging in law enforcement activities and turning over illegally seized 
evidence to the police for use at trial. Id. To discourage such vigilantism and 
prevent police from benefitting from illegal behavior, the Texas exclusionary 
rule bars the use of evidence illegally seized by private citizens, in addition to 
barring evidence illegally seized by police. Id. 
254 Nat’l Sheriff’s Ass’n., USA on Watch—National Neighborhood Watch 
Program, Neighborhood Watch Manual, at 17 (2010), https://www.bja.gov
/Publications/NSA_NW_Manual.pdf. 
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violate the law. By enacting legislation that guides and governs the 
activities of neighborhood watch associations, state legislatures would 
not only recognize their growing importance in the prevention and 
detection of crime, but also limit the powers they wield within 
communities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The powers that the State grants to police are significant. To 
balance these powers with individual liberties and to ensure that these 
liberties are not unnecessarily intruded upon, federal and state law 
provide rigorous procedural protections to individuals who are the 
subject of police action.255 Yet when private organizations take on the 
role of law enforcement, these procedural safeguards are often 
abandoned or ignored. At the same time, laws permitting the 
ownership of weapons and extending the right to use deadly force in 
self-defense have empowered private individuals engaged in quasi-law 
enforcement functions.256 
Perhaps nowhere is this more concerning than in the realm of 
neighborhood watch associations. Without the training and oversight 
that private security guards often receive, or the training and oversight 
that police officers receive, the individual participants in neighborhood 
watch programs are given many of the powers of public law 
enforcement with little guidance or limitation. These neighborhood 
watch members can patrol the streets of their community and engage 
in illegal detentions, searches, seizures, and interrogations, without 
affecting the ability of the State to obtain a conviction based upon 
illegally obtained evidence. Indeed, police and prosecutors alike can 
benefit from the illegal activities of neighborhood watch participants 
by utilizing evidence that would be inadmissible if obtained by a 
public law enforcement officer. Thus, neighborhood watch 
associations wield significant enforcement power without any 
meaningful statutory restrictions. This can and has led to civil rights 
violations, in addition to far more tragic consequences.257 
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257 See, e.g., Brian Stelter, In Florida Shooting Case, A Circuitous Route to 
National Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at B1; Greg Botelho, What 
Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN.COM (May 23, 2012) 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/index
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A simple solution to this growing dilemma is for state legislatures 
to enact laws that address private criminal justice actors. The current 
absence of legislation addressing private law enforcement needs to be 
supplanted with clear rules governing the actions of neighborhood 
watch participants. Through the enactment of laws that restrict the 
ability of a neighborhood watch member to carry a weapon while on 
patrol or confront individual suspects, legislatures would limit the 
ability of the members to engage in coercive or illegal behavior. By 
enacting statutes that provide for mandatory training of neighborhood 
watch participants, legislatures could limit the impact of individual 
bias in targeting suspects by those participants. By statutorily 
providing for more probable and significant criminal and civil 
penalties for those engaged in illegal conduct while acting as members 
of a neighborhood watch program, state legislatures would deter such 
illegal conduct. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, by extending 
state statutory exclusionary rules to include the exclusion of evidence 
illegally obtained by private individuals, state legislatures could better 
ensure the fairness of the criminal justice process. Similarly, by 
refusing to use evidence obtained in violation of the laws to convict 
individuals, legislatures would more adequately protect due process 
rights essential to the American criminal justice system. 
Thus, state legislatures could effectively address the problems 
presented by the growing number of neighborhood watch programs 
and expansion of self-defense and gun ownership laws. By enacting 
statutes designed to limit the behavior of those engaged in private law 
enforcement activities, legislatures could better preserve due process 
guarantees and ensure the fairness of the criminal justice process. 
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